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Abstract
In this paper we first develop a Dialetheic Logic with Exclusive Assumptions
and Conclusions, DLEAC. We adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP)
extended with a notion of model suitable for DLEAC, and we modify its proof
theory by refining the notions of assumption and conclusion, which are under-
stood as speech acts. We introduce a new paradox – the rejectability paradox –
first informally, then formally. We then provide its derivation in an extension
of DLEAC contanining the rejectability predicate.
1 Introduction
Rejection is standardly considered a speech act that expresses an attitude of dissent.
In the last years, some calculi – whose aim is to formalize such a notion, such as the
refutation or rejection calculi – have been proposed.
For a general introduction to these calculi, specifically in propositional logic,
see [19]. Let me review two examples: Skura’s refutation calculi (developed in
[16]) and Wansing’s [21] natural deduction calculus. Skura’s refutation calculi (see
[16] but also [17], and [18]) is based on a £ukasiewicz-style refutation calculi for
propositional logics (see on this [20]). Skura proposed a system for the modal logic
of S4 in [17]. With the same purpose, H. Wansing, in his [21] (and in other papers),
introduced a natural deduction calculus whose central idea was to begin with pairs
comprising a set of assertions and a set of rejections, obtaining a similar pair by
inference. Wansing’s idea was to dualize the introduction and elimination rules for
intuitionistic propositional logic with a primitive notion of dual proof to obtain a
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kind of bi-intuitionistic propositional logic that combines verification and its dual,
i.e. falsification.
Here I propose a refutation calculus based on a dialetheic conception of negation
and refutation or denial.
Dialetheic negation is not exclusive, whereas denial is: in a dialetheic framework
A and ¬A may both be true, but you cannot correctly assert and deny A. This
is how Priest in [10] tries to recover the exclusivity of negation by introducing the
notion of rejection or denial1 as a speech act. He claims that while it is possible
to accept both a sentence and its negation2, one cannot accept and reject the same
sentence. Assertion and rejection or denial are incompatible speech acts.
In this paper, I take the impossibility of accepting and rejecting the same sentence
as primitive. In this way, I conceive the rejection of sentence A as a speech act that
– in virtue of its very meaning – expresses the fact that A is only false. Similarly,
the act of rejecting ¬A expresses the fact that A is only true.
This dialetheic use of rejection suggests a theory of natural deduction, where
the acts of assuming and concluding may be understood in an ordinary or exclusive
mode. To assume a sentence in an ordinary mode amounts to supposing that it is at
least true; to assume it in an exclusive mode amounts to supposing that it is only
true.
To assume A in the ordinary mode then corresponds to the assertion of A,
whereas to assume A in the exclusive mode corresponds to the rejection of ¬A.
Any sentence can be rightfully assumed in an ordinary or exclusive mode at will.
Similarly, to prove a sentence in an ordinary mode proves that it is (at least) true
(under certain assumptions); to prove it in an exclusive mode proves that it is only
true.
Accordingly, concluding in the ordinary mode is to be understood as the assertion
of the conclusion, and concluding in the exclusive mode as the rejection of the
negation of the conclusion.
The acts of proving A and ¬A in an exclusive mode are incompatible because
they both indefeasibly lead to the rejection of some assumptions they depend on.
Specifically, concluding A and ¬A in an exclusive mode –independent of any hy-
pothesis – cannot in principle be performed by any rational human being. In this
way, I realize the dialetheic aim of taking exclusivity as extraneous to the meaning
of logical negation and embedded in the speech acts of assuming and concluding. I
am going to formalize such speech acts within a modified natural deduction, where
they will be governed by indefeasible rules.
1 For a general background on denial in non-classical theories, see [13, §3].
2 On the thesis see, also, [8]. For a recent discussion of the topic see also [7].
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The goal of this paper is to formulate the above-mentioned modified natural de-
duction, via a dialetheic logic with exclusive assumptions and conclusions DLEAC,
where exclusivity is expressed via certain speech acts. Specifically, in DLEAC, ex-
clusivity is expressed using the speech acts of assuming and concluding. In this
paper, I adopt the semantics of the logic of paradox (LP)3 extended with a notion
of model suitable for DLEAC and I modify its proof theory by refining the notions
of assumption and conclusion, which are understood as speech acts (I follow, in this
part of the paper, [5]). In the second part of the paper, I introduce a new paradox
– the rejectability paradox – first informally, then formally; I give its derivation in
an extension of DLEAC.
2 The Basics of DLEAC
Let me first introduce the basic elements of DLEAC, specifically its syntax and
semantics.
Let L be a language of first-order logic with identity (FOL =) with individual
constants and predicates of any ariety. For the sake of simplicity, I omit function
symbols in L. I adopt the semantics for LP extended with a new, generalized notion
of the model.
Let me briefly review the semantics for LP.4
A dialetheic interpretation of the propositional logic consists of an evaluation v
that assigns to each atomic formula a member of the set {{1}, {0}, {0, 1}}. The v
is extended to the complex formulas using the following clauses:
(‚) v(A ‚ B) = {1} if either 0 /œ v(A) or 0 /œ v(B);
v(A ‚ B) = {0} if 1 /œ v(A) and 1 /œ v(B);
v(A ‚ B) = {0, 1} otherwise.
(·) v(A · B) = {1} if 0 /œ v(A) and 0 /œ v(B);
v(A · B) = {0} if either 1 /œ v(A) or 1 /œ v(B);
v(A · B) = {0, 1} otherwise.
(¬) v(¬A) = {1} if v(A) = {0};
v(¬A) = {0} if v(A) = {1};
v(¬A) = {0, 1} otherwise.
A sentence A is true if 1 œ v(A), is false if 0 œ v(A);
A is exclusively true if 0 /œ v(A), is exclusively false if 1 /œ v(A).
3For a general background on LP, see [1], [2], [9], [15], [3].
4For details see [11, sez. 5.2, 5.3].
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This semantics is extended in a similar way to first order logic with identity. I
simplify, making the assumption that there is a name in the language L for every
object of the domain D of quantification.
An evaluation v assigns to every individual constant a member of the domain
D, and assigns to every unary predicate P two subsets of D: the extension P +
and the counter-extension P ≠, possibly overlapping, with the only constraint that
P + fi P ≠ = D. Then:
v(Pa) = { 1} if a œ P + ≠ P ≠
v(Pa) = { 0} if a œ P ≠ ≠ P +
v(Pa) = { 0, 1} if a œ P + fl P ≠
Similarly for predicates of degree > 1.
The constraints for the identity sign (=) are the following:
(=)+ = {(a, a) : a œ D} , while (=)≠ is arbitrary with the only constraint
that (=)+ fi (=)≠ = D.
The clauses for the universal and existential quantifiers are analogous to those
of conjunction and disjunction, respectively.
I extend the semantics of LP by introducing a notion of model suitable for DLEAC.
Let S be any set of sentences of a first order language L, some of which may be
starred (i.e. marked by a star *). Observe that stars * do not belong to the object
language L.
A model M of S is an LP-interpretation in which all sentences of S are
true and the starred ones are exclusively true.
A sentence A (a starred sentence A*) is a semantic consequence of a
set S of possibly starred sentences, in symbols S |= A(*), if it is true
(exclusively true) in every model of S.
3 DLEAC: Deductive rules
Let A, B, C... be formulas of a first order language L, and let   be a finite set of
possibly starred formulas.
A sequent is an expression of the form:
 : C (*),
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to be read: “From the assumptions in  , one can infer the conclusion C (in an
ordinary or exclusive mode).”
The non-starred formulas in   are assumed to be in an ordinary mode, and the
starred ones in an exclusive mode. Similarly, the conclusion C can be understood
in an ordinary or in an exclusive mode.
3.1 Basic deductive rules for DLEAC
In this section I list the primitive inference rules (I follow [5]). When stars occur in
parentheses ( ) the deductive rule holds in the double form:
• with all stars in parentheses at work




The informal reading of the first rule is the following: From the assumption that
A is only true (at least true), it follows that A is only true (at least true). The
informal reading of the second rule is: From the assumption that A is only true it
follows that A is (at least) true.
Weakening:
  : A(*)
    : A(*)
Cut:
  : A(*),   A(*): B
    : B
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  : A(*),   A(*) : B*
    : B*
Conjunction:
  : A(*),   : B(*)
I·
    : A · B(*)
  : A · B(*)
E·
  : A(*)




  : A (*)
I‚
  : A ‚ B (*)
 A : C(*),   B : C(*),   : A ‚ B
E‚
      : C(*)
 A* : C(*),   B*: C(*),   : A ‚ B*
E‚
      : C(*)
Double negation:
A (*) : ¬¬A(*)
¬¬A (*) : A(*)
Introduction of absurd (IA):
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  : A*,   : ¬A
   : A · ¬A*
The informal justification of IA is the following: From A and ¬A follows A·¬A.
Furthermore, since A is only true, it cannot be a dialetheia; therefore ¬A also cannot
be a dialetheia. As a result, neither of the conjuncts of A · ¬A can also be false,
and therefore, A · ¬A is only true.
Since ¬(A·¬A) is a dialetheic logical law, the conclusion A·¬A* is an authentic
absurd, i.e. a conclusion unacceptable even by a dialetheist. Since, dialethically,
A·¬A might be true, it does not count as an absurd. For this reason, by an absurd,
I mean a formula A · ¬A that is only true.
Reductio ad absurdum (RAA):
 A*: B · ¬B*
  : ¬A
 A: B · ¬B*
  : ¬A*
Informally, RAA works in this way: If the assumption that A is true (only true)
leads to the authentic absurd, it cannot be true (only true), hence it is only false (at
least false).
The rules for the quantifiers are analogous to those of conjunction (·) and dis-
junction (‚). The rules for identity are as follows:
Introduction of identity (I =):
: x = x
Elimination of identity (E =):
x = y, Px : Py
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 A*: ¬(t = t)*
E =   : ¬A
 A: ¬(t = t)*
E =
  : ¬A*
Observe that, according to the semantics of identity (=), a sentence having the
form (t = t)5 cannot be exclusively false.
3.2 Derived deductive rules for DLEAC
In this section, I introduce some derived rules of DLEAC:
Material conditional:
 A (*): B(*)
  : ¬A ‚ B
 A*: B
  : ¬A ‚ B
 A: B(*)
  : ¬A ‚ B(*)
Elimination of absurd (Ex absurdo quodlibet) (EA):
  : A · ¬A*EA
  : B*
Notice that EA is a derived rule.
Modus ponens (MPP):
  : A*,   : ¬A ‚ B
MPP    : B
5where ’t’ is an individual constant or a variable.
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  : A,   : ¬A ‚ B*
MPP1
   : B*
For an example of how DLEAC works, here is the derivation of MPP1:
1 1. A Assumption
2 2. ¬A ‚ B* Assumption
3 3. ¬A* Assumption
1, 3 4. A · ¬A* IA
1, 3 5. B* EA
6 6. B* Assumption
6 7. B* Reflexivity
1, 2 8. B* E‚
Following LP, the material conditional is not a genuine conditional because, in
general, it does not permit the validity of MPP.6 In this approach, the validity of
MPP is appropriate under a starred assumption. This way, we obtain the following
reading of the quasi-validity of MPP for a dialetheist: MPP is appropriate when at
least one of the two premises is starred.
The following are other derived rules of DLEAC.
De Morgan rules:
  : ¬(A · B)(*)
  : ¬A ‚ ¬B (*)
  : ¬A ‚ ¬B (*)
  : ¬(A · B)(*)
  : ¬(A ‚ B)(*)
  : ¬A · ¬B(*)
  : ¬A · ¬B(*)
  : ¬(A ‚ B)(*)
The Law of non-contradiction:
6For an extended discussion of this topic see [4].
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  : ¬(A · ¬A)
The Law of the excluded middle:
  : (A ‚ ¬A)
4 The Completeness of DLEAC
Let S be any set of possibly starred sentences.
I suggest that S is dialetheically consistent (d ≠ consistent) if no con-
clusion of form (A · ¬A)* is derivable from S.
Theorem 1. If S is d ≠ consistent, then it has a model M.
Proof. Let S be d ≠ consistent. Extend the language L to a language LÕ with an
infinite sequence of new individual constants c1, c2, ..., cn, .... Let
A1, A2, ..., An, ...
be a sequence of all L’-sentences. I inductively define the sequence:
S0, S1, ..., Sn, ...
of sets of (possibly starred) LÕ-sentences as follows:
1. S0 = S;
2. Sn+1 = Sn if An+1 is derivable from Sn and is not an existential sentence;
3. Sn+1 = Sn fi {B(c)(*)} if An+1 = ÷xB(x) and Sn „ ÷xB(x)(*), where c is the
first constant not occurring in Sn nor in An+1;
4. Sn+1 = Sn fi {¬An+1(*)} if An+1 is not derivable from Sn.
Let us consider the following definition:
SÊ = finœN Sn
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One can prove by induction that each Sn is d ≠ consistent, so that SÊ is d ≠
consistent.
Consider, for example, 3. Suppose, by reduction, that Sn+1 is inconsistent. If
Sn+1 = Sn fi {B(c)}, then Sn „ ¬B(c)* and hence Sn „ ’x¬B(x)*, against the
d ≠ consistency of Sn. If Sn+1 = Sn fi {B(c)*}, then An+1 = ÷xB(x)*. Then
Sn „ ¬B(c) and hence Sn „ ’x¬B(x), against the d ≠ consistency of Sn.
SÊ is deductively complete: for any LÕ-sentence, if not SÊ „ A, then
SÊ „ ¬A*.
An interpretation I of LÕ can be defined as follows. Take the set D of all individual
constants as domain. Evaluation v can be defined as follows:
1 œ v(A) i  SÊ „ A, 0 œ v(A) i  SÊ „ ¬A, for every atomic LÕ-sentence.
One can prove, by induction on the complexity of a sentence A, that v(A) = {1}
i  SÊ „ A*, v(A) = {0} i  SÊ „ ¬A *, v(A) = {0, 1} i  SÊ „ A and SÊ „ ¬A.
It follows that I is a model of SÊ and hence of S.
Completeness. If S |= A(*) then S „ A(*)
Proof. Let S |= A. Suppose, by reduction, that it is not the case that S „ A. Then
S fi {¬A*} is d ≠ consistent and hence has a model where ¬A is only true, against
the hypothesis. Similarly if S |= A*.
5 Extending a theory with the truth predicate
In this section, I show (I refer to what is done in [5]) that any dialetheic interpretation
of a first order language L can be extended to an interpretation of a language LÕ
capable of expressing its own truth predicate.
Let L be a first order language with predicates and individual constants (for
simplicity, I ignore functions). Let I be any interpretation of L and D its domain
of quantification. Extend L with a new predicate symbol T and infinitely many
individual constants. Extend D to DÕ by adding all LÕ-sentences to D. Let I Õ map
the new constants 1-1 onto DÕ so that any member of DÕ has an LÕ-name. If A is an
LÕ-sentence, we indicate by ÁAË its name.
I Õ puts all sentences in the counter-extension of the L-predicates and the members
of D in the counter-extension of T. As shown (in [5]), it is possible to fix the
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interpretation of T in such a way that it turns out to be the truth predicate of I Õ,
so that, for all LÕ-sentences A, A and T(ÁAË) have the same truth values.
Theorem 2. There is an extension of I to an interpretation I Õ of LÕ such
that, for every LÕ ≠ sentence A, A and TÁAË have the same truth values,
while the values of the L ≠ sentences, relativized to D are unchanged.
An evaluation vÕ is a sub-evaluation of v, in symbols vÕ µ v, if vÕ is obtained from
v by suppressing a truth value of some atomic dialetheias.
Lemma. If a sentence has a unique v-value, this is also the unique vÕ-
value, for any vÕ µ v.
Proof. The proof is obtained by an induction on the complexity of the sentence.
Proof of the theorem 2. The following sequence can be defined by transfinite induc-
tion:
v0 ∏ v1 ∏ ... ∏ v–, ... (for all ordinals).
They are evaluations of sentences of form T(ÁAË) for all LÕ-sentences A:
v0(T(ÁAË) = {0, 1} for all A;
v–+1(TÁAË) is defined by cases:
(i) v–+1 (TÁAË) = v–(A) if v–(A) is a singleton, while v– (TÁAË) is not;
(ii) v–+1 (TÁAË) = v– (TÁAË) otherwise.
v— (T(ÁAË)) = fl–<— v– (T(ÁAË)) for — limit.
One can prove, by transfinite induction, that:
for all –, if v– (TÁAË) is a singleton, then v– (TÁAË) = v–(A).
1. – = 0. Trivial
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2. – = — +1. Let v– (TÁAË) be a singleton. We distinguish the two cases above
(i) and (ii):
(i) v– (TÁAË) = v— (A) and, since v— (A) is a singleton and v– is a sub-
evaluation of v—, by the lemma v– (A) = v—(A).
(ii) v– (TÁAË) = v— (TÁAË). Therefore, v— (TÁAË) is a singleton. By the
induction hypothesis, v— (TÁAË) = v—(A) and, by the lemma, v–(A)= v—(A).
3. – limit. If v– (TÁAË) is a singleton, then v– (TÁAË) = v— (TÁAË) = v—(A), for
some — < –. By the lemma, v–(A) = v—(A).
Observe that if v— ”= v– with — < –, there is some sentence A such that v—(A)
= {0, 1}, while v“(A) is a singleton for all “ > —. And since only countably many
sentences can satisfy–for some ordinal–this condition, it follows that at least from
the first uncountable ordinal on, the sequence becomes stationary. If ” is such an
ordinal, v” is clearly the required evaluation.
Consider then the following familiar rules for a truth predicate.
Primitive Tarki’s rules:
  : A (*)
  : T(ÁAË)(*)
  : T(ÁAË)(*)
  : A (*)
From the above-mentioned rules, it follows that, semantically, T(ÁAË) and A








The guiding idea of the evaluation constructed above suggests that, when Tarski’s
rules fail to determine a unique value for a sentence of form T(ÁAË), there is no reason
to arbitrarily choose one of the two truth values for T(ÁAË), which will, therefore,
be evaluated as a dialetheia.
Conservativity. The extension of any theory by means of the predicate T with
Tarski’s rules is conservative.
Proof. It is derivable from Completeness and Theorem 1.
6 The refutation paradox in DLEAC
Let us go back to the speech acts of assertion and denial. Classically, to deny A is
equivalent to asserting ¬A: A is correctly denied i  ¬A is correctly asserted,7 but
the dialetheic denial of A is stronger than the assertion of ¬A. As Littman and
Simmons observed in [6], because the dialetheist appeals to “non-standard relations
between assertability and deniability”, a full account of these notions is required.
Specifically, any such account would need to deal with apparent paradoxes that turn
on the notion of assertability and/or deniability.
In their paper Littman and Simmons proposed a paradox concerning assertion,
the assertability paradox ([6], 320). Take a sentence – having the form:
(–) – is not assertable.
They argue that (–) is a dialetheia. Here is the proof they give:
Proof.
Suppose (–) is true. Then what it says is the case. So (–) (i.e. (–) – is not assertable)
is not assertable. But we have just asserted (–). So (–) is assertable–and we have a
contradiction.
Suppose, on the other hand, that (–) is false. Then what (–) says is not the case,
and (–) is assertable. So we may assert: (–) is not assertable. Again, we have a
contradiction.
7[14] calls this the denial equivalence.
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If – is a dialetheia, then it is both assertable and not assertable. But how is it
possible to both assert and not assert a sentence? This seems to be impossible also
for a dialetheist. While acknowledging that certain sentences can be both true and
false, a dialetheist cannot admit that a sentence is assertable and not assertable:
“there seems to be no room for manoeuvre. So, the dialetheist will need to say
more” ([6], 320).
Note that there is a problem in the proof of the assertability paradox: The
mere supposition that – is true does not imply its assertability. Indeed, assertability
implies the recognition, not just the mere supposition, of the truth of (–).
In the following text, I propose a revised version of the assertability paradox
called the amended assertability paradox. To amend the argument, a reasoning by
which the truth of (–) can be recognized is provided. The reasoning is given by the
following proof.
Let us prove dialetheically that – is true by distinguishing the following two
cases:
• (1) Assume that (–) is false. Then, its negation is true, so (–) is assertable
and then it is true.
• (2) Assume that (–) is true. Then it is true.
According to the Law of the excluded middle – as formulated in classical first
order logic – (–) is true. In this way, we have a proof – not just a supposition – of
the truth of (–), and we can assert it. So (–) is assertable, in opposition to what(–)
claims and is false. Therefore it is a dialetheia. That is the revised assertability
paradox.
Now, again, let us repeat our question: If – is a dialetheia, it is both assertable
and not assertable, but how is it possible to both assert and not assert a sentence?
Is this a real problem for a dialetheist? The quick answer is, ‘No’. Why should
it be a problem for a dialetheist to admit that a sentence is both assertable and
not assertable? Once the exclusivity of logical negation has been rejected, the non
assertability of a sentence does not exclude its assertability, even if it is far from
clear what it means that a certain sentence is and is not assertable.
Here I am not interested in giving a philosophical answer to the above questions.
They concern the philosophical status of these speech acts, and this is not the place
to discuss them.
Priest, in ([12]) proposed something similar to the assertability paradox: the
irrationalist paradox. Let I be a sentence having the form:
(I): it is not rational to accept I.
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You can both accept and and reject (I).
Priest’s derivation is as follows ([12] 121).
Proof.
Let Rat be an operator expressing rational acceptance and R = ¬Rat(R), Priest
derives R from the schema






That is, R, and hence ¬Rat(R), is deducible from P : P „ R.
Assuming that rational acceptance (Rat) is closed under single-premise deducibil-
ity, and that P is rationally acceptable (and it seems to be: if someone believes A,
and, at the same time, believes that it is not rationally permissible to believe A, that
would seem to be pretty irrational – not something that is itself rationally permissi-
ble), we have Rat(P ) „ Rat(R), and we have a contradiction.
Priest calls this kind of paradox a rational dilemma. He observes that a dialethe-
ist cannot rule out a priori the occurrence of rational dilemmas:
Arguably, the existence of dilemmas is simply a fact of life ([10], 111).
Moreover, he maintains that the irrationalist’s paradox is much more problematic
for a classicist than for a dialetheist. For the latter it is not irrational to believe both
a sentence – and that it is irrational to believe –, if such a belief is also rational,
an option clearly closed to a fan of classical logic. This argument is in line with the
observation to the assertability paradox done before: if negation is non-exclusive, a
dialetheist can rightly assert a non-assertable sentence, if she has recognized that it
is also true.
Again, it is not the aim of this paper to debate Priest’s argument on the irra-
tionalist paradox.
I would like just to expand the revised assertability paradox in a rejection di-
rection. In what follow I first informally introduce the rejectability (or deniability)
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paradox, then I give its derivation in an extension of DLEAC with the rejectability
predicate.
Let R be a sentence having the form:
(R) the sentence R is rejectable.
You can both accept and reject (R).
Proof.
Assuming that (R) is true, then it is rejectable. So, there is a state of knowledge in
which one can reject it. In such a state, one recognizes that what (R) says is true,
so that one is in a position to assert (R). So you both reject and accept R. Thus,
the assumption of (R) leads to a state (of knowledge) in which one can both assert
and reject (R), and that is dialetheically inacceptable.
It then follows that (R) cannot be true. But, then, we can reject it, recognize its
truth and assert it, which, again, is in opposition of Priest’s thesis of the impossibility
of accepting and rejecting the same sentence. Again: dialetheically inacceptable.
Notice – en passant – that, in contrast with the assertability paradox, the deni-
ability paradox goes against the dialetheist thesis that assertion and rejection are
incompatible speech acts.
Since, as in the amended assertability paradox, evidence of truth or falsity must
be available, the agent is assumed to be able to recognize them by the reasoning
displayed in the informal proof. The agent is then assumed to have some minimal
logical, semantical, and pragmatical skills.8 Such requirements are fairly minimal
and are ordinarily satisfied by normal agents in normal circumstances. If a dialethe-
ist tried to avoid the paradox by rejecting such an assumption, she would make
dialetheism a viable view only for limited cognitive agents. Such an extreme move
would be like invoking the ghost of Tarski at the cognitive level, by limiting the
cognitive resources of an agent instead of the expressive capacity of the language.
In the next part of this section I logically argue that, in a dialetheic logic, such
as DLEAC (which is compatible with dialetheism), expanded with a rejectability
predicate (which is used in natural languages with some intuitive derivation rules
for the introduction and elimination of rejection) a strong absurd can be derived.
8In particular, she must be able to understand (R) and truth and falsehood predicates, be
capable of rejecting and asserting, having elementary logical skills, and some ability to reflect on
her own reasoning processes.
393
Carrara and Strollo
Let ‘R’ be the rejectability predicate R(ÁAË) is to be read: A is rejectable; or
more explicitly: an ideal rational human can reach indefeasible reasons for excluding
the truth of A.
While assuming an ideal agent with such epistemic capacities might be problem-
atic in general, in the context of (R) it is justified. As the informal argument of the
paradox shows, evidence for truth and falsity of (R) is indeed attainable. General-
izing the inference rules of (R) to other contexts would be possible at the price of
introducing complications unnecessary for present purposes.9






Let k be a sentence of form R(ÁkË):
1 1. R(ÁkË) Assumption
1 2. ¬R(ÁkË)* ER
1 3. R(ÁkË) · ¬R(ÁkË)* IA
4. ¬R(ÁkË)* RAA
5. R(ÁkË) IR
6. R(ÁkË) · ¬R(ÁkË)* IA
Notice that (6) is a strong absurd in DLEAC.
On the contrary, observe that – according to conservativity as it was formulated
in Sec.5 – it is impossible to use the liar paradox to obtain an absurd. Indeed, while
you obtain a formula saying that the liar is false, there is no formula saying that it
is only false, as is shown in the following proof.
Let A be a sentence of form ¬T(ÁAË). You have that T(ÁAË) is a dialetheia.
9For example, (IR) should also require that evidence is available for ¬A*, which is the case,
however, in the case of (R). To be fully complete, the proof should also incorporate the reasoning
through which the agent recovers such evidence.
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1 1. T(ÁAË) Assumption
1 2. ¬T(ÁAË) Tarski





8. ¬T(ÁAË) · T(ÁAË) I·
Observe that–even using the starred assumptions–you can not get an absurd, as
in the following proof:
1 1. T(ÁAË)* Assumption
1 2. ¬T(ÁAË)* Tarski
1 3. ¬T(ÁAË) · T(ÁAË)* IA
4. ¬T(ÁAË) RAA
5. T(ÁAË) Tarski
6. ¬T(ÁAË) · T(ÁAË) I·
7 Conclusion
In the first part of the paper I exposed DLEAC, a dialetheic logic in which exclusivity
is expressed via the speech acts of assuming and concluding. An expansion of DLEAC
with a predicate for rejection and some intuitive derivation rules for its introduction
and elimination led to a strong absurd, a problem for a dialetheist.
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